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Abstract In this paper I show that Elga’s argument for a restricted principle of
indifference for self-locating belief relies on the kind of mistaken reasoning that
recommends the ‘staying’ strategy in the Monty Hall problem.
1 Elga’s Restricted Principle of Indifference
Elga (2004) argues for a restricted principle of indifference for self-locating belief.
Indifference: A rational agent ought to assign equal credence to worlds that
agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred on agents whose
experiences are indistinguishable.1
This principle is restricted in two ways. Firstly, it only applies to centred worlds
rather than being a full-blown principle of indifference. In this sense it differs from
the kind of indifference principle usually discussed in philosophy of probability.
Secondly, it only applies to centred worlds that agree on all uncentred propositions.
In other words, this principle wouldn’t apply in the following case: suppose W is the
actual world centred on you and W’ is a Matrix-like world in which one of the
people connected to machines has the exact same subjective experiences you have
in W. This principle does not recommend assigning equal credence to W and W’
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1 This is an elaboration of Elga’s (2004: 387) INDIFFERENCE. The way I formulate this principle here:
(1) brings to the fore that it is imposing a constraint on the credal state of any rational agent; and (2)
elucidates the scope of the principle. See Weatherson (2005: 614) for a detailed discussion of (2).
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because although you and your counterpart have indistinguishable experiences, you
inhabit different worlds. Elga labels a principle of indifference that would apply in
such a situation the ABSURD-CLAIM-THAT-I-DON’T-ENDORSE (387). To
illustrate his restricted principle of indifference, Elga introduces the story of Dr.
Evil:
Dr. Evil: ‘‘Safe in an impregnable battlestation on the moon, Dr. Evil had
planned to launch a bomb that would destroy the Earth. In response, the
Philosophy Defense Force (PDF) sent Dr. Evil the following message:
‘Dear Sir, (…) We have just created a duplicate of Dr. Evil. The duplicate—
call him ‘‘Dup’’—is inhabiting a replica of Dr. Evil’s battlestation that we
have installed in our skepticism lab. At each moment Dup has experiences
indistinguishable from those of Dr. Evil. For example, at this moment both Dr.
Evil and Dup are reading this message. We are in control of Dup’s
environment. If in the next ten minutes Dup performs actions that correspond
to deactivating the battlestation and surrendering, we will treat him well.
Otherwise we will torture him. Best regards, The PDF’’’ (383)
Elga argues that upon receiving this message, Dr. Evil should assign equal credence
to being Dr. Evil and to being Dup. In this paper I rationally reconstruct Elga’s
argument and show that it relies on the kind of mistaken reasoning that recommends
the ‘staying’ strategy in the Monty Hall problem.
2 Elga’s Argument for Indifference
Consider the following variation of Dr. Evil:
Comatose Dr. Evil: Just like Dr. Evil, only that the scientists tell Dr. Evil that
when he was asleep they’ve put Dup to sleep, too, and that they flipped a coin
with bias .9 towards Tails. Then they made sure only one of them woke up: if
the coin landed Heads, it was Dr. Evil (and Dup is in a coma). If the coin
landed Tails, it was Dup (and Dr. Evil is in a coma).2
If the coin lands Heads, Dr. Evil is reading the message from PDF. If the coin lands
Tails, Dr. Evil is in a coma on the Moon and Dup is reading the message back in the
skepticism lab. In Comatose Dr. Evil, Elga argues Dr. Evil ought to align his
credence that he is Dr. Evil to the bias of the coin. In other words, upon reading the
message, Dr. Evil’s degree of belief in being Dr. Evil ought to be .1.3
2 This is a variation of Coma in Elga (2004: 390–391). Elga in fact moves away from Dr. Evil and
develops his entire argument for INDIFFERENCE based on a completely analogous set of scenarios
involving Al and his Duplicate. Nevertheless, there is no need to do that, and I will present his reasoning
as it applies to Dr. Evil.
3 Those familiar with Elga’s (2000) discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem may find surprising what
he says about Dr. Evil’s degrees of belief in Comatose Dr. Evil. Such a view goes against the thirder
answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Titelbaum (2012) has already noticed this tension: ‘‘it was Elga
himself who originally argued for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty Problem, an answer that is
incompatible with the Relevance-Limiting Thesis’s position on the irrelevance of centered evidence to
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Consider another variation of Dr. Evil:
Coin Toss Dr. Evil: Just like Dr. Evil, only that the scientists tell Dr. Evil that
while they were duplicating him they flipped a coin with bias .9 towards Tails.
But they assure him the coin toss had no impact on the duplication process.
In Coin Toss Dr. Evil, upon receiving the message from PDF, Dr. Evil should
assign probability .1 to the coin having landed Heads (H, and T for Tails). Secondly,
since the coin toss is independent from the duplication process, he should assign the
same probability conditional on him being Dr. Evil (E, and D for Dup). That is:
P Hð Þ ¼ :1 ð1Þ
P HjEð Þ ¼ :1 ð2Þ
Suppose in Coin Toss Dr. Evil, PDF were to send Dr. Evil a second message
saying that if the coin landed Heads then Dup fell in a coma and Dr. Evil is now
reading the message and if the coin landed Tails, Dup is reading the message and
Dr. Evil is in a coma on the Moon, that is HE_TD. Elga argues that in such case,
Dr. Evil’s credal state in Coin Toss Dr. Evil upon reading the second message
should align with his credal state in Comatose Dr. Evil upon reading the message of
that scenario.4 In other words,
P HjHE _ TDð Þ ¼ :1 ð3Þ
(1)–(3) are enough to derive Dr. Evil’s degree of belief in being himself in Coin
Toss Dr. Evil after being told about the coin toss but before receiving the
information that HE_TD:
• From (2) and (3): P(H|HE_TD) = P(H|E)
• By def. of cond. prob.: P(HE)/(P(HE) ? P(TD)) = P(HE)/(P(HE) ? P(TE))
• By simplification: P(TD) = P(TE)
• By independence of the duplication and the coin toss: P(T)P(D) = P(T)P(E)
• By simplification: P(D) = P(E).
Therefore, Dr. Evil should assign equal credence to being himself and to being
Dup in Coin Toss Dr. Evil, after being told about the duplication, but before being
told that HE_TD. Since the coin toss in Coin Toss Dr. Evil has no causal impact on
the duplication process, Dr. Evil’s credal state after being told about the duplication
and the coin toss (but before receiving the second message) is the same as his credal
state in Dr. Evil upon simply being told he had been duplicated. It is true that in
Coin Toss Dr. Evil the scientists tell Dr. Evil more than in Dr. Evil, but that
Footnote 3 continued
uncentered propositions. A thirder about Sleeping Beauty can’t just assume that [Dr. Evil] should assign a
degree of belief of 0.10 to heads when he awakens in [Comatose Dr. Evil]!’’ (353).
4 ‘‘So when [Evil] wakes up in the [Comatose Dr. Evil] case, he has just the evidence about the coin toss
as he would have if he had been awakened in [Coin Toss Dr. Evil] and then been told [HE_TD].’’ (Elga
2004: 391).
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additional information has no bearing on whether he is Dup or Dr. Evil. Therefore,
in Dr Evil he should divide his credence equally between being Dr. Evil and being
Dup upon receiving the message about duplication from the scientists.
Finally, Dr. Evil is taken by Elga to be a prototypical example of a rational agent
contemplating worlds that agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred on
agents whose experiences are indistinguishable. Consequently the move from ‘a
rational agent’ to Dr. Evil is done without loss of generality. That means that
whatever rational requirements bind Dr. Evil’s credal state, they ought to bind, on
pain of irrationality, any agent. In particular, if Dr. Evil is rationally required to
assign equal credence to the centred worlds he is contemplating, so should any
agent. Since the above argument establishes, according to Elga, that Dr. Evil should
indeed be indifferent between the world centred on himself and the one centred on
Dup, so should any other rational agent, and Indifference follows.
3 The Monty Hall Problem
At the same time PDF is trying to thwart Dr. Evil’s plans, on some TV set Monty
Hall attempts to trick a contestant into making the losing choice in a game show:
Monty Hall: Monty presents a game contestant with three doors. Behind two
of these doors there is a goat. One of the doors, however, hides a brand new
car. The contestant is asked to pick a door. Monty then opens one of the other
two doors such that he doesn’t give the prize away. Afterwards he asks the
contestant which door she wants to open - the one she initially chose, or the
other remaining closed door.
Suppose the door behind which the car is hidden is chosen at random. Suppose
further that the contestant first picks Door 1. Monty hopes the contestant will reason
in the following way: ‘initially, there was a 1/3 chance the car was behind Door 1.
Now that Monty opened one door hiding a goat, there are only two possible
locations the car could be in, i.e. behind Door 1 or behind the door Monty left
unopened. Therefore the probability the car is behind the door I selected increased
to  and the probability the car is behind the other unopened door is also . So
there is no reason for me to switch.’5
Here is a probabilistic model vindicating the above informal reasoning. Let Car 1
stand for the car being behind Door 1, Car 2 for the car being behind Door 2 and Car
3 for the car being behind Door 3. The sample space assumed above is {Car 1, Car
2, Car 3}, while the information Monty gives away when opening Door X that hides
a goat is taken to be * Car X. Finally, P(Car 1) = P(Car 2) = P(Car 3) = 1/3.
Assume Monty opens Door 2. Then, upon receiving the information from Monty,
the contestant will update her beliefs in the following way:
5 This is a standard assumption made in this puzzle, but notice it relies on a type of conservativism: a
rational agent should not revise her strategy, unless she has a positive reason to do so.
A. Marcoci
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P Car 1j  Car 2ð Þ ¼ P Car 1 &  Car 2ð Þ=P Car 2ð Þ
¼ P Car 1ð Þ= P Car 1ð Þ þ P Car 3ð Þð Þ
¼ 1=3ð Þ= 2=3ð Þ
¼ 1=2
Therefore the contestant should ‘stay’. As it is well known, however, this
reasoning is incorrect.
Bovens and Ferreira (2010: 474–476), following Speed’s (1985) discussion of
Shafer (1985), explain the mistake in terms of the fact that when we are informed of
some proposition ‘‘we do not only learn the proposition in question, but also that we
have learned the proposition as one of the many propositions that we might have
learned.’’ (474) The difference between updating on some proposition rather than
updating on learning that proposition is nicely highlighted in Halpern (2004:
128–9):
If I think my wife is much more clever than I, then I might be convinced that I
will never learn of her infidelity should she be unfaithful. So, my conditional
probability for Y, ‘I will learn that my wife is cheating on me’, given X, ‘She
will cheat on me’, is very low. Yet, the probability of Y if I actually learn X is
clearly 1.
Applying this insight to the Monty Hall problem Bovens and Ferreira explain the
contestant’s mistaken reasoning by the fact that she updated only on the content of
the information Monty gave her when he opened Door 2 and revealed a goat. If she
instead were to consider how the information Monty can pass on to her is
constrained she would notice that the probability Monty would open a particular
door is not the same irrespective of the state of world. This is easy to see: assume the
car is behind Door 3, then the goats are behind Doors 1 and 2. Monty cannot open
the former, as this is the one the contestant chose at the beginning of the round.
Therefore Monty is forced to open Door 2. An analogous reasoning applies if the car
is behind Door 2. But if the car is behind Door 1, then Monty can open either Door 2
or Door 3. So the probability with which he would open Door 2, say, in this case can
be lower than 1. This asymmetry in how Monty can communicate with the
contestant is made clear by considering the protocol under which information can
accrue to the contestant. A conditional probability table can be used to specify a
protocol:
Protocol 1 for Monty Hall Car 1 Car 2 Car 3
‘‘Goat 2’’  0 1
‘‘Goat 3’’  1 0
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In this table, each row corresponds to a possible item of information the
contestant could receive. Each cell corresponds to the probability with which the
contestant will learn that item of information at each possible world. This table can
be used to construct a sophisticated event space in which we take into consideration
every piece of information the agent could receive. Such a space would contain four
atomic events with non-zero probability: {(Car 1, ‘‘Goat 2’’), (Car 1, ‘‘Goat 3’’),
(Car 2, ‘‘Goat 3’’), (Car 3, ‘‘Goat 2’’)}. Note the differences between this
sophisticated model and the model above vindicating the mistaken reasoning
recommending ‘staying’. Firstly, the model contains 4 events with positive
probability. Secondly, in this model we express the fact that Door 2 hides a goat
and that Door 3 hides a goat as disjoint propositions which are not reducible
to * Car 2 and * Car 3, respectively. In other words, carefully accounting for the
process by which information accrues to the contestant turns the set of propositions
on which she can conditionalise into a partition. This is implicit in Shafer’s formal
model of protocols as trees (Shafer 1985: Appendix 1) and is discussed at length in
Gru¨nwald (2013). The latter also formulates a rule of thumb: ‘‘briefly, for general
spaces Y, if the set of events X on which you can condition is not a partition of Y,
then conditioning on any of these events is unsafe.’’ (Gru¨nwald 2013: 243).
We can now calculate again how the contestant should change her degrees of
belief upon Monty opening Door 2, say, and revealing a goat.
P Car 1j ‘‘Goat 2’’ð Þ
¼ Pð‘‘Goat2
00jCar 1ÞPðCar 1Þ
Pð‘‘Goat2’’jCar 1ÞPðCar 1Þ þ Pð‘‘Goat2’’jCar 2ÞPðCar 2Þ þ Pð‘‘Goat2’’jCar 3ÞPðCar 3Þ
¼ ð1=2  1=3Þð1=2  1=3Þ þ ð0  1=3Þ þ ð1  1=3Þ
¼ 1=3
Therefore, taking into account the asymmetry of the way in which information
may accrue to her, the contestant learns something new about where the car may be.
Is this the only protocol that would make sense in Monty Hall? Although the puzzle
is quite detailed with respect to how information is being delivered to the contestant,
the scenario does not say Monty flips a fair coin in order to choose which door to
open when the car is behind Door 1. Another protocol compatible with the story
would be:
Protocol 2 for Monty Hall Car 1 Car 2 Car 3
‘‘Goat 2’’  0 1
‘‘Goat 3’’  1 0
This represents a situation in which Monty would have a preference for opening
Door 2 when the car is behind Door 1 and the contestant chooses Door 1 at the
A. Marcoci
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beginning of the game. Imagine him flipping a coin with bias  towards opening
Door 2 when the car is behind Door 1. Then upon learning that Door 2 hides a goat,
the contestant’s credence in the car being behind Door 1 should go from 1/3 to 3/7.
So what is the correct answer then: ‘staying’ or ‘switching’? The first
probabilistic model suggests the contestant’s rational posterior credence should be
 and hence she should ‘stay’. The second probabilistic model suggests her
credence should be 1/3 (or 3/7 depending on the bias of the coin Monty flips) and
hence she should ‘switch’. What this shows is that the solution Monty Hall problem
is sensitive to the structure of the interaction between Monty and the contestant is,
despite the puzzle being silent on some of the details.
Are we rationally required, though, to take protocols into account? Bovens and
Ferreira (2010: 480) and Shafer (1985: 264) claim it is implicit in the Principle of
Total Evidence that an agent’s probability model should give probabilities for all the
different ways her learning may turn out. The motivation for this goes back to the
observation that when you receive some information Y, you don’t only learn the
propositional content of Y, but also that you have received Y instead of Y’. So,
insofar as Y represents your evidence, so does the fact that you learned Y instead of
Y’. Therefore if you take the Principle of Total Evidence as a requirement for
forming rational beliefs, then protocols should be taken into account.
4 The Protocol of Coin Toss Dr. Evil
In his formal analysis of Coin Toss Dr. Evil (see Sect. 2), Elga assumes there are
four possible states of the world: either the person reading the message from PDF is
Dr. Evil or he is Dup; and either the coin landed Heads or it landed Tails, viz. {HE,
TE, HD, TD}. Furthermore, he assumes the information PDF could send Dr. Evil,
i.e. that either he is himself and the coin came up heads or that he is Dup and the
coin came up Tails, is reducible to a disjunction of two possible states of the world
(HE_TD). Finally, Elga calculates the probability of H given HE_TD. However,
this is an analogous strategy to the one that leads to the ‘staying’ solution in the
Monty Hall problem, as shown in the previous section. The moral of Monty Hall is
that the Principle of Total Evidence requires that in cases in which information X is
conveyed to an agent the appropriate formal model of her learning X should account
for her learning not only that X is the case but also that she has learned X ‘‘as one of
the many propositions that [she] might have learned.’’ (Bovens and Ferreira 2010:
474) In other words, if we were to focus on the conditional probability of H given
HE_TD we would indeed get Elga’s conclusion; but then we wouldn’t be correctly
modelling the fact that Dr. Evil learns HE_TD. If we want to model the latter, then
we need to formally account for the protocol with which information accrues to Dr.
Evil.
So what is the protocol underlying Coin Toss Dr. Evil? We know PDF could send
a second message to Dr. Evil saying ‘‘Heads and Dr. Evil or Tails and Dup’’.
Following the discussion above, this should be modelled as a new proposition,
‘‘HE_TD’’. However, we don’t know anything else about what other information
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the scientists could include in that second message. Consider the following protocol,
where a and b are arbitrary parameters:
Protocol 1 for Coin Toss Dr. Evil HE TE HD TD
‘‘HE_TD’’ a 0 0 b
… … … … …
Given this protocol, the probability of the coin having landed Heads given the
scientists’ message (P’) is:
P’ Hð Þ ¼ P Hj‘‘HE _ TD’’ð Þ
¼ Pð‘‘HE _ TD
00jHÞPðHÞ
Pð‘‘HE _ TD’’jHEÞPðHEÞ þ Pð‘‘HE _ TD’’jTEÞPðTEÞ þ Pð‘‘HE _ TD’’jHDÞPðHDÞ þ Pð‘‘HE _ TD’’jTDÞPðTDÞ
¼ P ‘‘HE _ TD
00jHE _ HDð ÞPðHE _ HDÞ
aP HEð Þ þ bPðTDÞ
¼ Pðð‘‘HE _ TD
00&HEÞ _ ð‘‘HE _ TD00&HDÞÞ
aP HEð Þ þ bP TDð Þ
¼ Pð‘‘HE _ TD
00&HEÞ þ Pð00HE _ TD00&HDÞ
aP HEð Þ þ bP TDð Þ
¼ Pð‘‘HE _ TD
00jHEÞPðHEÞ
aP HEð Þ þ bP TDð Þ
¼ aPðHÞPðEÞ
aP Hð ÞP Eð Þ þ bPðTÞPðDÞ
¼ aPðEÞ
aPðEÞ þ 9bPðDÞ
Elga claims that P’(H) should be equal to the probability of Heads, that is 1/10.
Solving the equation
aPðEÞ
aPðEÞ þ 9bPðDÞ ¼
1
10
we obtain that
aP Eð Þ ¼ bP Dð Þ:
Therefore (assuming there are no extreme values) the probability of being Dr.
Evil is equal to the probability of being Dup if and only if a = b. In other words, the
agent should consider it equally likely to be told HE_TD in a Heads world in which
he is Dr. Evil as in a Tails world in which he is Dup. This is by no means certain.
One could easily conceive of the following protocol underlying Coin Toss Dr. Evil:
Protocol 2 for Coin Toss Dr. Evil HE TE HD TD
‘‘HE_TD’’  0 0 1
‘‘HD_TE’’ 0   0
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Protocol 2 for Coin Toss Dr. Evil HE TE HD TD
‘‘HE_TE_HD’’    0
In this case, PDF can send three messages to Dr. Evil and they have different
likelihoods based on the possible world that obtains. The relevant asymmetry is that
the scientists will definitely announce HE_TD whenever TD obtains but will only
announce it with probability  when HE obtains. In this case, even if one were to
accept Elga’s claim that P’(H) = 1/10, then P(E) = 2P(D), which means that Dr.
Evil would consider it twice more likely to be himself rather than Dup.
To sum up, if we apply the Principle of Total Evidence in Coin Toss Dr. Evil and
model the information Dr. Evil receives explicitly, Elga’s conclusion only follows if
a = b. Nevertheless, the assumption that a = b is not incompatible with Elga’s Coin
Toss Dr. Evil (the scenario underdetermines the different messages PDF could send
to Dr. Evil). So prima facie it may seem that Elga’s argument simply requires an
additional innocuous assumption about the protocol underlying Coin Toss Dr. Evil
for the conclusion that P(E) = P(D) to go through.
5 Against Elga’s Argument
The fact that the conditional probability of the scientists’ announcement in HE has
to be equal to the conditional probability in TD spells trouble for Elga’s argument
for Indifference. Recall Elga’s argumentative strategy:
Claim A: Dr. Evil’s credal state after receiving the message from PDF in
Comatose Dr. Evil is identical to his credal state in Coin Toss Dr. Evil after
being told he has been duplicated and learning ‘‘HE_TD’’.
Claim B: Therefore Dr. Evil should assign equal credences to being himself
and being Dup upon being told he has been duplicated in Coin Toss Dr. Evil
(and before receiving the second message).6
Claim C: But upon learning he has been duplicated in Coin Toss Dr. Evil (and
before receiving the second message), his credal state is identical to his credal
state in Dr. Evil (modulo the irrelevant difference that he now knows a coin
independent of his duplication has been flipped).
Claim D: Therefore, in Dr. Evil, he should assign equal credences to being
himself and being Dup.
Claim E: Given Dr. Evil is a prototypical scenario for the restricted principle
of indifference for self-locating beliefs, Indifference holds.
Consider Claim A. The argument in the previous section establishes that Claim A
only holds if a particular restriction is placed on the protocol under which
information is passed to Dr. Evil/Dup by the scientists. Not all possible learning
6 This follows from (1) to (3) above.
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scenarios will support Claim A. So if Claim A were to hold, then the scientists
should follow a protocol compatible with a = b, and both Dr. Evil and Dup should
be aware of this protocol.
One could reply to this that there is nothing preventing us from tweaking Coin
Toss Dr. Evil in order to account for this protocol. Assume we come up with a story
that makes the receipt of the second message from PDF equally likely in HE as in
TD. Let’s call this new scenario Coin Toss Dr Evil?. Claim A only holds if we
replace Coin Toss Dr. Evil with Coin Toss Dr. Evil?.
Now, consider Claim C. If Claim C were to hold, then the same knowledge of the
protocol which is now embedded into Coin Toss Dr. Evil? should obtain in Dr. Evil.
Dr. Evil should be aware that the scientists could flip a fair coin independently of the
duplication process, and if they do flip it, they could announce that the coin came up
heads to Dr. Evil or that the coin came up tails to Dup. Finally, Dr. Evil should also
be aware that it is as likely for them to announce this if he indeed is Dr. Evil and the
coin came up heads as it is if he is in fact Dup and the coin came up tails. So, for
Claim C to hold Dr. Evil has to be replaced with Dr. Evil?.
However, Dr. Evil’s credal state in Dr. Evil? contains this protocol and hence his
credal state is no longer a prototypical credal state of an agent faced with worlds that
agree on all uncentred propositions and are centred on agents whose experiences are
indistinguishable. Hence, Dr. Evil can no longer serve as the instantiation of an
arbitrary rational agent as the move from Indifference to Dr. Evil? cannot be done
without loss of generality. To wit, Dr. Evil assigns a credence of  to being Dr. Evil
not in a prototypical case of Indifference, but in a case in which information accrues
to him according to a particular protocol. In consequence, the step back from Dr.
Evil to Indifference is no longer warranted.
Therefore, either Elga’s argument fails at the very outset when credences from
Comatose Dr. Evil are imported to Coin Toss Dr. Evil, or at the last step when Dr.
Evil’s credences cannot be attributed to an arbitrary rational agent dealing with
worlds agreeing on all uncentred propositions and centred on agents whose
experiences are indistinguishable.
Before concluding, here is another way of making the same argument as in the
above pages. Suppose Elga’s argument is correct and hence:
In [Coin Toss Dr. Evil], the coin toss is irrelevant to whether and how the
duplication occurs. So [Evil]’s state of opinion (when he awakens) as to
whether he is [Evil] or the duplicate ought to be the same in [Coin Toss Dr.
Evil] as it is in [Dr. Evil]. (Elga 2004: 388)
Consider now a variation of Coin Toss Dr. Evil in which it is made clear that
Protocol 2 underwrites the informational exchange between PDF and Dr. Evil and
the latter knows this. In such a scenario the toss of the coin would also be
‘‘irrelevant to whether and how the duplication occurs’’. Therefore, by Elga’s
reasoning, Dr. Evil’s credence function in Dr. Evil ought to match his credence
function in this modified scenario, too. But as we saw above, with Protocol 2 in
place, P(E) = 2P(D). Consequently in Dr. Evil, Dr. Evil ought to believe both that
the probability of being himself is equal to that of being Dup and equal to 1/2, and
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that it is twice the probability of being Dup. This would make Dr. Evil
probabilistically incoherent.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I show that Elga’s argument for Indifference fails. This failure is
interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the restricted principle of indifference is part of
both the Halfer (e.g. Elga 2000; Dorr 2002) and Thirder (e.g. Lewis 2001) answers
to the Sleeping Beauty problem7 as well as part and parcel of several arguments in
the literature on self-location (e.g. Leitgeb and Bradley 2006; Ross 2010). Secondly,
the mistake in Elga’s argument is in itself interesting, as it illustrates the need for
specifying a precise sample space when applying conditionalization. In this respect,
the paper shows that Monty Hall still has important lessons to teach us.
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